Below is a list of trades made since 1993 that have involved only NFL draft picks, not players. There might be some late-round trades from 1993 or 1994 that are missing, but this should include every other trade since 1993. Any additions or corrections are welcome. And yes, there have been three trades (in 1995, 1997 and 2011) when teams have traded down without getting anything additional in return.
1993 DRAFT
11 = 14, 83
13 = 19, 75
18 = 20, 116
20 = 26, 81
29, 112 = 46, 54, 94, 213
33 = 36, 120
41 = 58, 81
41, 82, 110, 138 = 48, next 1st
44 = 49, 107
64 = 82, 104
65 = 73, 127
72 = 81, 152
92 = 100, 156
99 = 110, 138
112 = 119, 156
1994 DRAFT
5 = 7, 83
7 = 15, 56, 100
12 = 13, 144
16 = 20, 89
23, 217 = 28, 62
29 = 40, next 2nd
37 = 40, 118
52 = 55, 125
53 = 84, 149, 175, 190
65 = 89, 115, 121
80 = 94, 152
107 = 121, 135
120 = 126, 169
1995 DRAFT
1 = 5, 36
7, 72 = 12, 43, 63
10 = 30, 94, 119, next 1st
19 = 31, 97, 134, next 4th
22, 188 = 32, 63, 173
28 = 41, 63
29 = 34, 98, 100
33 = 40, 71
41 = 46, 110
51 = next 1st
70 = 82, 115
84 = 90, 160
111 = 121, 196
112 = next 3rd
123 = 136, next 6th
119 = 147, next 5th
138 = 152, 226
169, 219 = 208, 210, 248
191 = next 6th
231 = 234
1996 DRAFT
9 = 17, 48, 109
13 = 18, 83, 201
17 = 21, 91
30 = 37, 67
41 = next 1st
49 = 60, 99
55 = 65, 100, 213
57 = 76, 124, 149
60, 99 = 79, 98, 134, 150
76 = 86, 119, 195
97 = 112, 137
98, next 7th = 113, 125
99 = 110, 146
111 = 122, 159, 235
135 = 161, 162
157 = next 4th
192 = next 5th
1997 DRAFT
1 = 6, 67, 102, 207
3, 63 = 11, 41, 70, 100
6 = 8, 104
6 = 12, 63
13, 110 = 18, 91, 116, 181
22 = 25, 155, next 3rd
38 = 40, 173
54 = 65, 101
55 = 57, 190, 227
67 = 88, 191, 229, next 6th
71 = 84, 188
77 = 86, 156
107 = 116, 165
112 = 121, 170, 173
123 = 157, 166, 203
138 = 215, next 4th
140 = 180, 222
146, 218 = next 3rd
193 = 213
1998 DRAFT
19 = 29, 60
23 = 34, 59
41 = 56, 87, 149
43 = 1st in two years (2000)
45 = 53, 114
59 = 1st in two years (2000)
60 = 79, 143, 172
65 = 67, 195
70 = 85, 116
93 = 103, 124, 154
102 = 112, 142
104 = next 3rd
109 = 113, 191
137 = 199, 203, 215
138 = 162, 197
152 = 156, next 6th
200 = next 6th
215 = next 6th
1999 DRAFT
5 = 12, 71, 107, 144, 179, 218, next 1st, next 3rd
7 = 12, 71, 106, 143, next 3rd
17 = 20, 82, 191
20 = 22, 140
24 = 27, 134
27 = 39, 70, 142
37 = 40, 144
40, 102 = 47, 78, 111
42 = next 1st
43 = 54, 84, next 6th
44 = 59, 73, 163
46 = 52, 117
70 = 72, 232
96 = 99, 171
137 = next 4th
146, 163 = next 3rd
165 = 179, 218
170 = 187, 191
174 = 184, 207
182 = 195, 233
207 = 221, 253
2000 DRAFT
3 = 12, 24, 119, 154
10 = 15, 45
12 = 16, 48
51 = 57, 120
61 = 68, 135
86 = 119, 154
98 = 108, 132
111 = next 3rd
104 = 125, 150, 225
138 = 158, 195
150 = 170, 209
154 = 175, 231
209, 225 = 223, 232, 254
212 = next 6th
231 = next 6th
238 = next 6th
2001 DRAFT
7, 191 = 9, 82, 222
14 = 21, 51
22 = 30, 91, 193
37 = 52, 81
39 = 50, 112
48 = 50, 173
51 = 58, 110
52 = 56, 122
53 = 70, 81
61 = 78, 114
69 = 86, 119
88, 187 = next 2nd
96 = 112, 139
145 = 154, 186
149 = 180, 216
170 = next 5th
215, 219, 226 = next 4th
2002 DRAFT
6 = 8, 75, next 6th
14 = 15, 110
18 = 21, 89
17 = 18, 158
20, 156 = 28, 60
21 = 32, 96, 234
52, 96 = 56, 87
61 = 69, 102
63, 129 = 72, 104, 140
67 = 73, 145
79 = 89, 118
96 = 112, 155
116 = next 3rd
117 = 131, 144
122 = 147, 189
168 = 237, next 5th
2003 DRAFT
4 = 13, 22, 116
6, 37, 102 = 17, 18, 54
13 = 14, 193
15 = 30, 62
16 = 27, 92, 200
19 = 41, next 1st
36, 117 = 41, 75
45 = 50, 120
78 = next 2nd
79 = 94, 127
82 = 108, 120, 227
83, 262 = next 2nd
120 = 128, 157
138 = next 4th
143 = 176, 193, 218
147 = 165, 203
150, 200 = 153, 189
154, 225 = 164, 201, 243
166 = 185, 244
181 = 226, 247
245 = next 6th
2004 DRAFT
1 = 4, 65, next 1st, next 5th
6 = 7, 37
16 = 28, 58
19 = 20, 119
22 = 43, 144, next 1st
24 = 26, 123
27, 159 = 40, 71, 103, 138
28 = 31, 127
29, 90 = 38, 69, 125
30 = 36, 105, next5th
38 = 44, 107
48 = 50, 151
55 = 70, 102
59, 161 = 68, 141, 173
72 = 86, 118
81, 151 = 139, next 2nd
82 = 88, 155
87 = 102, 153
104 = 112, 147
153 = 160, 222
156 = 182, 206
159 = 175, 210
174 = 186, 219
179 = 188, 226
182 = 205, 223
2005 DRAFT
13 = 16, next 3rd
23 = 26, 105
25 = 76, next 1st, next 4th
37 = 41, 113
45 = 54, 121
64 = 84, 195, next 3rd
89 = 115, 126
94 = 102, 175
112 = 120, 154
123 = 127, 185
126 = 167, 175, 245
132, next 6th = 148, next 4th
144 = 155, 231
145, 206 = next 4th
148 = next 4th
175 = 195, 246
175 = 230, next 5th
2006 DRAFT
11 = 15, 68
12 = 13, 181
22 = 37, 68
25 = 32, 96, 129
26 = 42, 73
35 = 53, 189, next 2nd
36 = 52, 75
37, 139 = 47, 93, 148
39 = 45, 116
44 = 56, 87
49 = 53, 189, 211
64 = 83, 95
71 = 76, 220
80 = 92, 125
93 = 109, 183
109 = 115, 185
138 = 150, 189
197 = 213, 236
238 = next 6th
2007 DRAFT
14, 191 = 25, 59, 164
17 = 21, 86, 198
22 = 36, next 1st
26 = 36, 87, 159
28 = 110, next 1st
33 = 38, 105
34 = 43, 74
37 = 62, 93, 167, next 3rd
41 = 44, 121
42 = 126, next 1st
47, 235 = 63, 89, 191
53, 195 = 67, 103, 178
58 = 66, 145
61 = 74, 101
86 = 101, 166, 203
91 = 211, next 3rd
102 = 106, 182
107 = 123, 163
112 = 119, 192
117 = 139, 154
121 = 176, 233, next 3rd
149 = 194, 198, 203
195 = 200, 234
2008 DRAFT
7, 164 = 10, 78
8 = 26, 71, 89, 125
15, 76 = 17, 66, 136
18 = 26, 89, 173
19 = 43, 109, next 1st
21, 84, 154 = 34, 48, 103
25 = 28, 163, 235
30 = 36, 113
38 = 55, 86
43, 152 = 47, 117
52 = 58, 158, next 7th
64 = 66, 176
69 = 160, next 2nd
92 = 111, next 4th
103 = 124, 157
100 = 104, 213
102 = 113, 162
104 = 122, 155
110 = 115, 208
111 = next 3rd
115, 175 = 120, 158
123 = 130, 194
128 = 137, 217
137 = 150, 209
143 = 155, 213
144 = 146, 218
153 = 160, 238
157, 228 = 168, 180
191 = next 5th
237 = next 6th
2009 DRAFT
17 = 19, 191
19 = 21, 195
23 = 26, 162
26, 162 = 41, 73, 83
37 = next 1st
40, 164 = 47, 124, 199
43, 111 = next 1st
49 = 68, 105
51 = 75, 110
56 = 61, 165
64, 132 = 79, 84
65 = 76, 115, 228
73 = 232, next 2nd
85 = 91, 164
89 = next 2nd
91 = 137, 213, next 3rd
117 = 120, 229
123, 198 = 137, 141
141 = 156, 210
150 = 158, 221
164 = 222, next 5th
174 = 235, next 5th
202 = 216, next 6th
222 = next 6th
237 = next 7th
2010 DRAFT
11 = 13, 113
13 = 24, 70, 87
22 = 24, 113
24, 119 = 27, 90
25 = 43, 70, 114
30, 128 = 34, 100, 214
39 = 42, 153
42 = 44, 190
47 = 58, 89
51 = 62, 93
55 = 59, 125
58 = 62, 150
59 = 71, 134, 146
71 = 86, 122
79 = 91, 173, next 4th
89 = next 2nd
93 = 102, 144
112 = 124, 198
119 = 126, 179
123 = 130, 201
135 = 149, 189
146 = 159, next 5th
158 = next 4th
163 = 174, 219
208 = 229, 231
220 = next 6th
225, 232 = next 5th
2011 DRAFT
6 = 27, 59, 124, next 1st, next 4th
10 = 16, 49
21 = 27, 70
28 = 56, next 1st
36 = 45, 108, 141
49 = 53, 152
53 = 62, 127
57, 157, 209 = 75, 107, 154, 205
60 = 73, 138
62 = 79, 146, 217
76 = 80, 182
85 = 90, 191
92, 125 = 219, next 2nd
104 = 116, next 4th
105, 178 = 127, 144, 152
129, 204 = 141, 186
145 = 158, 229
150 = 168, 170
153, 227 = 161, 194
163 = 174, 231
193 = 194
174, 231 = 179, 218
2012 DRAFT
2 = 6, 39, next 1st, 1st in two years (2014)
Any additions or corrections can be posted in the comments below.
Showing posts with label NFL draft picks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NFL draft picks. Show all posts
Sunday, April 22, 2012
Sunday, April 4, 2010
Should comp picks affect teams' personnel decisions?
When the Seattle Seahawks signed Unrestricted Free Agent special-teamer Sean Morey to a three-year contract last week, ESPN.com blogger Mike Sando noticed that the Seahawks might have cost themselves a compensatory draft pick in 2011 while also giving the rival Arizona Cardinals a comp pick for the loss of Morey.
Based on speculation by ESPN.com reporter John Clayton, Sando said Morey might cost the Seahawks a sixth-round comp pick that they could have gotten for losing Cory Redding to the Baltimore Ravens. Clayton's speculation might be a bit optimistic. Redding signed for $2.5 million per season, not the $3 million that Clayton reported, so he would be on the borderline for a sixth- or seventh-round pick, depending on his playing time in 2010. (Clayton's speculation that the Seahawks could get a fourth-round comp pick for Nate Burleson might be optimistic, too. Burleson's $5 million-per-year contract would put him on the borderline for a fourth- or fifth-round pick, depending on playing time.)
It's true that Morey could cost the Seahawks a comp pick if their list of qualifying players lost (Burleson and Redding) and signed (Morey) does not change, but is it really a poor decision for a team to forgo what might be a late seventh-round draft pick in order to sign a former Pro Bowl special-teamer? Even if Redding ends up with a sixth-round value in the comp picks formula, how likely is it that a late sixth-round draft choice will be more than a special-teams contributor, anyway? Yes, a team could strike gold with a late sixth-round choice, but it's also possible that the player taken with that pick won't even make the team. Morey, on the other hand, is a known commodity. The Seahawks very well might have taken potential comp picks into account and decided that Morey would be worth more than the comp pick they might get for losing Redding.
The Seahawks' situation might not be the best example of a team costing itself a comp pick because of a poor decision in free agency, but it does raise the issue of whether teams should factor comp picks into their personnel decisions. Sando noted that "the Cardinals' decision to sign UFA fullback Jason Wright might have cost the team a 2010 third- or fourth-round compensatory choice for losing Antonio Smith." Based on the fact that Baltimore received a third-rounder for Dominique Foxworth, the Cardinals surely would have gotten a third-rounder for Smith.
After this year's comp picks were awarded, Darren Urban, who blogs for the Cardinals' official Web site, responded to one fan's criticism of the team's front office by saying, "If you are managing your free agency based on hoping for a certain comp pick, you aren’t running your football team correctly." I would agree with Urban, to some extent. In fact, I would argue that it wasn't the Cardinals' decision to sign Wright in free agency that cost them a third-round comp pick, rather it was their decision to keep the third-string running back on their roster past Week 9. When they signed Wright in March 2009, they couldn't have known if, for example, they would be able to draft Beanie Wells a month later, or if Wells or Tim Hightower would get hurt early in the season and force Wright to get more playing time. But by Week 9, the Cardinals had Wells and Hightower carrying the load at running back and Wright contributing very little on offense while playing a fair amount on special teams. If they had waived Wright at that point in the season, he would not have counted in the comp picks equation, and the Cardinals would have received that third-round comp pick for losing Smith. Instead, they kept Wright all season. After Week 9, including the playoffs, he had only nine touches for 53 yards on offense, although he did play more than half of the snaps on special teams. Is that type of production from a six-year veteran worth a late third-round draft pick? I don't think it is. Wright is unlikely to develop into anything more than the player he is right now, but a player drafted in the third round is reasonably likely to develop into someone who can contribute more than Wright will – possibly much more. And if the Cardinals had waived Wright and either Wells or Hightower had gotten injured later in the season, the Cardinals could have simply re-signed Wright if no other team had claimed him or signed him by then.
The Cardinals might argue that they were in the hunt for a playoff spot, a division title or even a championship, and getting rid of a trusted veteran who provides depth at running back and contributes on special teams wouldn't help them achieve their ultimate goal. Whether that's a good enough reason to forgo a third-round comp pick is debatable, but it at least can be taken into consideration when judging the Cardinals' decision.
Clearly, releasing a player in midseason just to get a high comp pick the next year is not the best move for every team. The Dallas Cowboys, for example, were not going to release Igor Olshansky, Keith Brooking or Gerald Sensabaugh in Week 9 just to make sure that they would get a fourth-round comp pick for losing Chris Canty. Having a solid defensive starter during a playoff run is more important than obtaining a late fourth-round draft choice the following year.
There are times, though, when a team probably should make comp picks a factor in their personnel decisions. The Oakland Raiders, for example, had a 2-6 record when they went into their bye in Week 9 last season. During the previous offseason, they had lost only one free agent who could qualify for the comp pick equation: Jake Grove, whose contract almost certainly would (and did) give him a fourth-round value. They had signed three players who might have qualified, but after releasing Jeff Garcia and Lorenzo Neal before the season, they only one remaining on the team was Khalif Barnes, an offensive tackle who was signed to a one-year contract. Before the Raiders' bye week, Barnes filled in – not very well, by most accounts – as the starter at right tackle for two games while Cornell Green was out with a calf injury. After Week 9, Barnes was inactive for every game except the season finale, when he didn't even play. In retrospect, the Raiders certainly would have been better off releasing Barnes during their bye week. Barnes was under contract for only eight more games, Green was returning to the lineup, the season already was a lost cause, and the Raiders had two other backup tackles who either had started ahead of Barnes earlier in the season (Erik Pears) or would replace Barnes as the backup tackle who was activated for games after the bye (Langston Walker). If the Raiders had taken their potential comp pick into account, there would have been little reason for them to keep Barnes for the rest of the season, but that's what they did. So instead of receiving the 131st pick of the draft as compensation for losing Grove, they received the 251st pick as compensation for the difference in net value after losing Grove and signing Barnes. The Raiders fell 120 spots in the draft by keeping Barnes, who never played another snap for the rest of the season.
As I mentioned, I think Urban is mostly correct when he says that teams shouldn't manage their free agency just to get comp picks. Every team's goal during the offseason should be to acquire better players through any means possible, which would include signing Unrestricted Free Agents. If signing a quality starter would cost a team a potential fourth-round comp pick, so be it. However, it would be foolish for teams not to include comp picks in the decision-making process and even more foolish for teams to be unaware of their potential comp picks. If a team that stands to gain a high comp pick the following season is looking at signing either a UFA who would qualify for the comp picks equation or a player who was released by his former team and therefore would not qualify, the released player likely would be the better choice if the players were considered relatively equal – especially if the players under consideration would be mere backups. Potential comp picks are an even more important factor when the player being signed has a value that is far less than that of the player that was lost, such as in the case of the Cardinals and Raiders. In those cases, the team should be able to recognize that the low-value player could end up costing a high comp pick. That's why it would be wise for teams to monitor their potential comp picks during the regular season and consider making personnel moves before Week 10 to ensure that they aren't unnecessarily costing themselves a high draft pick by keeping a player who won't even contribute. A team could always decide that it wants to keep a certain player even if he might be worth less than the potential comp pick it will be forgoing, but any team that never takes potential comp picks into consideration is likely to end up costing itself valuable draft picks without even knowing it.
Based on speculation by ESPN.com reporter John Clayton, Sando said Morey might cost the Seahawks a sixth-round comp pick that they could have gotten for losing Cory Redding to the Baltimore Ravens. Clayton's speculation might be a bit optimistic. Redding signed for $2.5 million per season, not the $3 million that Clayton reported, so he would be on the borderline for a sixth- or seventh-round pick, depending on his playing time in 2010. (Clayton's speculation that the Seahawks could get a fourth-round comp pick for Nate Burleson might be optimistic, too. Burleson's $5 million-per-year contract would put him on the borderline for a fourth- or fifth-round pick, depending on playing time.)
It's true that Morey could cost the Seahawks a comp pick if their list of qualifying players lost (Burleson and Redding) and signed (Morey) does not change, but is it really a poor decision for a team to forgo what might be a late seventh-round draft pick in order to sign a former Pro Bowl special-teamer? Even if Redding ends up with a sixth-round value in the comp picks formula, how likely is it that a late sixth-round draft choice will be more than a special-teams contributor, anyway? Yes, a team could strike gold with a late sixth-round choice, but it's also possible that the player taken with that pick won't even make the team. Morey, on the other hand, is a known commodity. The Seahawks very well might have taken potential comp picks into account and decided that Morey would be worth more than the comp pick they might get for losing Redding.
The Seahawks' situation might not be the best example of a team costing itself a comp pick because of a poor decision in free agency, but it does raise the issue of whether teams should factor comp picks into their personnel decisions. Sando noted that "the Cardinals' decision to sign UFA fullback Jason Wright might have cost the team a 2010 third- or fourth-round compensatory choice for losing Antonio Smith." Based on the fact that Baltimore received a third-rounder for Dominique Foxworth, the Cardinals surely would have gotten a third-rounder for Smith.
After this year's comp picks were awarded, Darren Urban, who blogs for the Cardinals' official Web site, responded to one fan's criticism of the team's front office by saying, "If you are managing your free agency based on hoping for a certain comp pick, you aren’t running your football team correctly." I would agree with Urban, to some extent. In fact, I would argue that it wasn't the Cardinals' decision to sign Wright in free agency that cost them a third-round comp pick, rather it was their decision to keep the third-string running back on their roster past Week 9. When they signed Wright in March 2009, they couldn't have known if, for example, they would be able to draft Beanie Wells a month later, or if Wells or Tim Hightower would get hurt early in the season and force Wright to get more playing time. But by Week 9, the Cardinals had Wells and Hightower carrying the load at running back and Wright contributing very little on offense while playing a fair amount on special teams. If they had waived Wright at that point in the season, he would not have counted in the comp picks equation, and the Cardinals would have received that third-round comp pick for losing Smith. Instead, they kept Wright all season. After Week 9, including the playoffs, he had only nine touches for 53 yards on offense, although he did play more than half of the snaps on special teams. Is that type of production from a six-year veteran worth a late third-round draft pick? I don't think it is. Wright is unlikely to develop into anything more than the player he is right now, but a player drafted in the third round is reasonably likely to develop into someone who can contribute more than Wright will – possibly much more. And if the Cardinals had waived Wright and either Wells or Hightower had gotten injured later in the season, the Cardinals could have simply re-signed Wright if no other team had claimed him or signed him by then.
The Cardinals might argue that they were in the hunt for a playoff spot, a division title or even a championship, and getting rid of a trusted veteran who provides depth at running back and contributes on special teams wouldn't help them achieve their ultimate goal. Whether that's a good enough reason to forgo a third-round comp pick is debatable, but it at least can be taken into consideration when judging the Cardinals' decision.
Clearly, releasing a player in midseason just to get a high comp pick the next year is not the best move for every team. The Dallas Cowboys, for example, were not going to release Igor Olshansky, Keith Brooking or Gerald Sensabaugh in Week 9 just to make sure that they would get a fourth-round comp pick for losing Chris Canty. Having a solid defensive starter during a playoff run is more important than obtaining a late fourth-round draft choice the following year.
There are times, though, when a team probably should make comp picks a factor in their personnel decisions. The Oakland Raiders, for example, had a 2-6 record when they went into their bye in Week 9 last season. During the previous offseason, they had lost only one free agent who could qualify for the comp pick equation: Jake Grove, whose contract almost certainly would (and did) give him a fourth-round value. They had signed three players who might have qualified, but after releasing Jeff Garcia and Lorenzo Neal before the season, they only one remaining on the team was Khalif Barnes, an offensive tackle who was signed to a one-year contract. Before the Raiders' bye week, Barnes filled in – not very well, by most accounts – as the starter at right tackle for two games while Cornell Green was out with a calf injury. After Week 9, Barnes was inactive for every game except the season finale, when he didn't even play. In retrospect, the Raiders certainly would have been better off releasing Barnes during their bye week. Barnes was under contract for only eight more games, Green was returning to the lineup, the season already was a lost cause, and the Raiders had two other backup tackles who either had started ahead of Barnes earlier in the season (Erik Pears) or would replace Barnes as the backup tackle who was activated for games after the bye (Langston Walker). If the Raiders had taken their potential comp pick into account, there would have been little reason for them to keep Barnes for the rest of the season, but that's what they did. So instead of receiving the 131st pick of the draft as compensation for losing Grove, they received the 251st pick as compensation for the difference in net value after losing Grove and signing Barnes. The Raiders fell 120 spots in the draft by keeping Barnes, who never played another snap for the rest of the season.
As I mentioned, I think Urban is mostly correct when he says that teams shouldn't manage their free agency just to get comp picks. Every team's goal during the offseason should be to acquire better players through any means possible, which would include signing Unrestricted Free Agents. If signing a quality starter would cost a team a potential fourth-round comp pick, so be it. However, it would be foolish for teams not to include comp picks in the decision-making process and even more foolish for teams to be unaware of their potential comp picks. If a team that stands to gain a high comp pick the following season is looking at signing either a UFA who would qualify for the comp picks equation or a player who was released by his former team and therefore would not qualify, the released player likely would be the better choice if the players were considered relatively equal – especially if the players under consideration would be mere backups. Potential comp picks are an even more important factor when the player being signed has a value that is far less than that of the player that was lost, such as in the case of the Cardinals and Raiders. In those cases, the team should be able to recognize that the low-value player could end up costing a high comp pick. That's why it would be wise for teams to monitor their potential comp picks during the regular season and consider making personnel moves before Week 10 to ensure that they aren't unnecessarily costing themselves a high draft pick by keeping a player who won't even contribute. A team could always decide that it wants to keep a certain player even if he might be worth less than the potential comp pick it will be forgoing, but any team that never takes potential comp picks into consideration is likely to end up costing itself valuable draft picks without even knowing it.
Monday, March 8, 2010
Projecting the 2010 Compensatory NFL Draft Picks
Note: In order to save me the time I could spend visiting numerous forums and message boards answering questions about this year's projections, please direct anyone with questions to this blog. Questions that are posed in the comments section of this post and subsequent related posts will be answered. You do not need to register to comment.
As the NFL explains, compensatory picks are awarded to teams that lose more or better compensatory free agents than they acquire. The number of picks a team can receive equals the net loss of compensatory free agents, up to a maximum of four. Compensatory free agents are determined by a secret formula based on salary, playing time and postseason honors. Not every free agent lost or signed is covered by the formula.
Although the formula has never been revealed, by studying the compensatory picks that have been awarded since they began in 1994, I’ve determined that the primary factor in the value of the picks awarded is the average annual value of the contract the player signed with his new team, with an adjustment for playing time and a smaller adjustment for postseason honors. It should be noted that the contract value used in the equation does not include some parts of the contract, and that the contract information reported in the media is often incorrect.
Each qualifying player has a value based on his contract, playing time and postseason honors, and that value corresponds to a round in the draft. In the compensatory equation, each qualifying player that a team signs cancels out a qualifying player that the team lost whose value is the highest in the same round. If there are no lost players remaining in that round, the signed player cancels out the lost player whose value is the next-highest. A signed player will cancel out a lost player whose value falls in a higher round only if there are no remaining lost players. After all of a team's qualifying signed players have canceled out a lost player, the team can receive a comp pick for each qualifying player who remains. For example, consider a team that loses one qualifying player whose value falls in the third round and another qualifying player whose value falls in the sixth round but signs a qualifying player whose value falls in the third round. That team would receive a sixth-round comp pick because the signed player would cancel out the loss of the higher-valued player. If the signed player’s value were equal to a fourth-round pick or lower, however, the team would receive a third-round comp pick, because the signed player would cancel out the loss of the lower-valued player.
It is possible for a team to get a compensatory pick even if it doesn’t suffer a net loss of qualifying free agents. That type of comp pick comes at the end of the seventh round, after the normal comp picks and before the non-compensatory picks that are added if fewer than 32 comp picks are awarded. There have been 14 of these “net value” type of comp picks awarded, and in each case, the combined value of the free agents lost was significantly higher than the combined value of the free agents added. In all 14 cases, those teams lost the same number of qualifying free agents as they signed. No team has been awarded a comp pick after signing more qualifying free agents than it lost, no matter how significant the difference in combined value. This year, I’m projecting that Oakland will receive a net-value comp after losing Jake Grove and signing Khalif Barnes, whose value is less than one-sixth of Grove's value. According to my projections, none of the other teams that lost and signed the same number of qualifying players suffered a loss in value that was significant enough to warrant a net-value comp pick. Arizona came the closest, followed by Baltimore and Buffalo, but they all fell short of the projected loss in value that is necessary to receive a net-value comp pick.
For the third consecutive year, I’ve used a mathematical formula to weight the three factors that determine a player’s value in the comp equation (his contract, his playing time and his postseason awards, if any). Using this formula, I’ve been able to reconstruct almost precisely the order of the comp picks that were awarded in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. In two of those years, I have been able to reconstruct the exact order, and in other year, the only difference was that the order of two consecutive picks was switched because of a minuscule difference in values. I don’t know if I have the factors weighted correctly, but given that my projected order of a number of comp picks has frequently matched the order of the actual comp picks, I think I’m probably pretty close.
As always, please note that my comp pick formula is merely an attempt to project the results of the actual (secret) formula. I don’t pretend to know the actual formula, but I think previous results indicate that the formula I use is a pretty good simulation.
In order to qualify for the comp equation, a player must have been a true Unrestricted Free Agent whose contract had expired or was voided after the previous season (i.e., he cannot have been released by his old team); he must sign during the UFA signing period (which ended July 27 last year); if he signs after June 1, he must have been tendered a June 1 qualifying offer by his old team; his compensatory value or contract value must be above a specific minimum amount; and he cannot have been permanently released by his new team before a certain point in the season (which seems to be after Week 10) or, possibly, before getting a certain amount of playing time, unless he was claimed off waivers by another team.
The most difficult part about projecting the comp picks is determining all of the cutoff points – the minimum value needed to qualify and the value ranges for each round of the draft. The comp picks awarded in previous years suggest that the cutoff points increase each year by a small percentage – approximately the same percentage by which the leaguewide salary cap increases. From 2008 to 2009, the cap went up 9.65 percent, so I used a 9.65 percent increase when estimating the cutoff points for this year’s comp picks. In some cases, I used the percentage increases since 2007, 2006 or even 2005 to compare the values of this year's players to the values of qualifying players from previous years whose draft round value is known.
Last year, the lowest-paid player who is known to have qualified for the NFL’s comp equation was Aaron Glenn, who signed for a one-year deal for $870,000 and played a little less than 20 percent of the snaps in 2008. The highest-paid player who is known to have not qualified was Pierson Prioleau, who signed a one-year deal for $830,000 and also played a little less than 20 percent of the snaps. This year, there are eight players I consider "on the bubble" for qualifying. Floyd Womack, Jason Wright, Brett Romberg and John Owens each signed for at least $950,000 and should qualify, based on Glenn qualifying last year. Joe Berger, Mark Jones, Hunter Smith and Larry Izzo each signed for between $875,000 and $909,000 and are not projected to qualify, based more on Marcus Wilkins ($816,667) not qualifying for the 2008 comp picks than for Prioleau not qualifying in 2009.
There were two unusual cases this year, one involving Laveranues Coles and one involving Bobby Engram.
Coles renegotiated his contract on Feb. 25, 2009, giving up a $6 million guaranteed salary in exchange for allowing his 2009 season to void. Two days later, his contract voided, and he became an Unrestricted Free Agent. Plenty of players have qualified for the comp equation after becoming UFAs because their contract voided, even if the voidable year was put in the contract through renegotiation. However, Coles' situation is a little less clear because of the timing involved. Normally, a player "earns" a void in his contract by doing something more than simply waiting two days, so it's possible that the NFL will not consider Coles eligible for the comp picks equation. Players who have had contract years simply deleted — not converted to voidable years — by renegotiation have never qualified for the equation, and Coles' situation is close to that. However, because a voidable year has never disqualified a player from the equation, I am projecting that Coles will qualify.
Engram's situation is a little less complicated. He was released by Kansas City on Monday, Nov. 9, which was the last day of Week 9 and the start of Week 10. Previous cases of players being released during the season seem to indicate that players who are released by Week 10 and not claimed off waivers will not qualify for the comp picks equation. For that reason, I am projecting that Engram will not qualify, but because he released close to the deadline, it is possible that he will qualify.
Last year, regardless of playing time or postseason honors, the third-round comp players had signed for at least $6.5 million per season, the fourth-round comp players had signed for $4.8 million to $6 million, all but one of the fifth-round comp players had signed for $4 million to $5 million, the sixth-round comp players had signed for $2.7 million to $3.9 million, and the seventh-round comp players had signed for less than $2.65 million per season. Note that there are huge gaps between some rounds, and that there is an overlap between the fourth and fifth rounds because of the adjustments for playing time. You’ll find the contract values for each round of this year’s projected picks in the list a few paragraphs below this one.
I mentioned that all but one of last year's fifth-round comp players had signed for $4 million to $5 million. Because of a rule that had never been revealed until after last year's comp picks were awarded, the Pittsburgh Steelers got only a fifth-round comp pick for Alan Faneca, even though he signed for $7.8 million per season, played more than 98 percent of the Jets' offensive snaps and made the Pro Bowl. A rule stipulates that a team cannot receive more than a fifth-round comp pick for a player with 10 or more seasons of NFL experience. After the rule was revealed, I found several times in previous seasons when it had been invoked. What still is not known, however, is whether the rule applies to the player's value in the equation or whether it applies only for the placement of a comp pick. In other words, does it affect which player a 10-year veteran cancels out by being signed or lost, or does it come into play only when a team is due to receive a comp pick for a player with 10 or more seasons of experience? This year, there are no qualifying players with at least 10 years of experience whose value in the formula is higher than a fifth-round pick, so that question will remain unanswered for at least another year.
As I alluded to earlier, the NFL adds non-compensatory picks if fewer than 32 comp picks are awarded. The non-compensatory picks are given, in order, to the teams that would be drafting if there were an eighth round, until the maximum of 32 has been reached. If there are 29 comps, for example, the NFL would give additional picks to the teams that would have the first three picks in the eighth round, if there were one. This year, I’m projecting that 27 true comp picks will be awarded, including Oakland’s comp pick for a net-value loss, which I mentioned earlier. Therefore, I’m projecting that St. Louis, Detroit, Tampa Bay, Kansas City and Washington will receive non-compensatory picks to fill out the maximum number of picks. If the NFL’s equation results in more than three non-compensatory picks being added, the next five teams in line to receive one would be Cleveland, Oakland, Seattle, Buffalo and Chicago, in that order.
Here are the projected picks for 2010, along with the compensatory player, their contract value that was used in the equation, their games played and their games started (I’ve also noted the eight picks that fall near a cutoff point and could end up in a different round, along with two other picks that could be affected by the cutoff points) —
THIRD ROUND
Tennessee (Albert Haynesworth, $11.37 million per season, 12 GP/12 GS)
Cincinnati (T.J. Houshmandzadeh, $8 million, 16/16) — possibly a fourth- or fifth-round pick for Stacy Andrews
Atlanta (Dominique Foxworth, $6.8 million, 16/16) — possibly a fourth-round pick
FOURTH ROUND
None
FIFTH ROUND
Pittsburgh (Bryant McFadden, $4.75 million, 16/16)
Atlanta (Michael Boley, $4.8 million, 11/11)
Pittsburgh (Nate Washington, $4.47 million, 16/15) — possibly a sixth-round pick
SIXTH ROUND
Minnesota (Matt Birk, $4 million, 16/16) — possibly a fifth-round pick
Green Bay (Colin Cole, $4.28 million, 16/15) – possibly a fifth-round pick
Carolina (Geoff Hangartner, $3.15 million, 16/16)
Jacksonville (Mike Peterson, $3 million, 16/16)
Carolina (Frank Omiyale, $2.64 million, 16/12) — possibly a seventh-round pick
Miami (Renaldo Hill, $2.5 million, 15/15) — possibly a seventh-round pick
SEVENTH ROUND
New England (Jabar Gaffney, $2.5 million, 16/7) — possibly a sixth-round pick
Tennessee (Chris Carr, $2.5 million, 16/4) — possibly a sixth-round pick
Indianapolis (Darrell Reid, $2.27 million, 16/0)
Tennessee (Eric King, $2.125 million, 4/1)
Tennessee (Daniel Loper, $2 million, 8/5)
Pittsburgh (Byron Leftwich, $2 million, 3/3)
Philadelphia (Sean Considine, $1.45 million, 11/6)
Philadelphia (L.J. Smith, $1.5 million, 12/0)
San Diego (Mike Goff, $1.35 million, 8/7) — possibly a fifth- or sixth-round pick for Igor Olshansky
San Francisco (Donald Strickland, $1.11 million, 9/2)
New England (Lonie Paxton, $1.03 million, 16/0)
New England (Heath Evans, $1.05 million, 6/5)
Seattle (Floyd Womack, $950,000, 13/9)
New England (LaMont Jordan, $1.01 million, 9/0)
Oakland (net-value comp pick; lost $5.7 million, 12/10; signed $1 million, 6/2)
St. Louis (non-compensatory pick)
Detroit (non-compensatory pick)
Tampa Bay (non-compensatory pick)
Kansas City (non-compensatory pick)
Washington (non-compensatory pick)
As noted, the values of eight comp picks fell near the cutoff points between rounds, so it wouldn’t surprise me if the comp picks for Foxworth is in the fourth round, if the comp picks for Washington is in the sixth round, if the comp picks for Birk and/or Cole are in the fifth round, if the comp picks for Omiyale and/or Hill are in the seventh round or if the comp picks for Gaffney and/or Carr are in the sixth round. Of course, other projected picks could be off by one round (or more) if the NFL happened to change the formula or increase the cutoff points by significantly more or less than I projected.
In addition to those eight picks, two of the other comp picks could be affected by the cutoff points between rounds, if a player who was canceled out has a value in a round different from where I projected their value to be.
For Cincinnati, Laveranues Coles' value as a player signed is projected to be in the fourth round, but there is a chance that his value could be just enough to fall in the third round. If so, his signing will cancel out the loss of T.J. Houshmandzadeh, and the Bengals will receive a comp pick for the loss of Stacy Andrews, most likely in the fourth round but possibly in the fifth. In addition, if Coles is disqualified from the equation because his contract was renegotiated to void the 2009 season, the Bengals will receive comp picks for both Houshmandzadeh and Andrews.
For San Diego, Igor Olshanky's value as a player lost is on the borderline of the fifth and sixth rounds, and Kevin Burnett's value as a player signed is on the borderline of the sixth and seventh rounds. My projections put both of them in the sixth round, leaving the Chargers with a seventh-round comp pick for Mike Goff. However, if the values of Olshansky or Burnett – or both – do not fall in the sixth round, the Chargers will receive a comp pick for Olshansky instead of one for Goff. The placement of that pick will depend on whether Olshansky's value falls in the fifth round or the sixth round.
Here are the qualifying players lost and signed (in order of value) for the 16 teams that I’m projecting will receive comp picks, with the projected compensatory players in bold —
ATLANTA
Lost: Dominique Foxworth, Michael Boley, Keith Brooking, Grady Jackson
Signed: Mike Peterson, Brett Romberg
CAROLINA
Lost: Geoff Hangartner, Frank Omiyale
Signed: None
CINCINNATI
Lost: T.J. Houshmandzadeh, Stacy Andrews, Ryan Fitzpatrick
Signed: Laveranues Coles, J.T. O’Sullivan
GREEN BAY
Lost: Colin Cole
Signed: None
INDIANAPOLIS
Lost: Darrell Reid
Signed: None
JACKSONVILLE
Lost: Mike Peterson, Gerald Sensabaugh, Khalif Barnes
Signed: Tra Thomas, Sean Considine
MIAMI
Lost: Andre Goodman, Renaldo Hill
Signed: Jake Grove
MINNESOTA
Lost: Matt Birk, Darren Sharper
Signed: Karl Paymah
NEW ENGLAND
Lost: Jabar Gaffney, Lonie Paxton, Heath Evans, LaMont Jordan
Signed: None
OAKLAND
Lost: Jake Grove
Signed: Khalif Barnes
PHILADELPHIA
Lost: Brian Dawkins, Tra Thomas, Correll Buckhalter, Sean Considine, L.J. Smith
Signed: Stacy Andrews, Sean Jones, Leonard Weaver
PITTSBURGH
Lost: Bryant McFadden, Nate Washington, Byron Leftwich
Signed: None
SAN DIEGO
Lost: Igor Olshansky, Mike Goff
Signed: Kevin Burnett
SAN FRANCISCO
Lost: Bryant Johnson, Ronald Fields, J.T. O’Sullivan, Donald Strickland
Signed: Brandon Jones, Moran Norris, Demetric Evans
SEATTLE
Lost: Rocky Bernard, Maurice Morris, Leonard Weaver, Floyd Womack
Signed: T.J. Houshmandzadeh, Colin Cole, John Owens
TENNESSEE
Lost: Albert Haynesworth, Brandon Jones, Chris Simms, Chris Carr, Eric King, Daniel Loper
Signed: Nate Washington, Jovan Haye
Anyone else who was lost or signed by one of those teams last offseason is not projected to qualify for the equation, for one reason or another. Remember, players have to meet certain criteria in order to qualify for the equation (see the eighth paragraph of these projections for a summary of the criteria), so a lot of players will not count in the equation. Most of the time, it’s either because the player had been released by his previous team and therefore was not a true UFA or because the player didn’t sign for enough money to qualify.
If I’m wrong about the values of certain players or whether some players will or will not qualify for the equation, that will affect the comp picks. Here’s what would happen in certain instances –
If Laveranues Coles does not qualify, Cincinnati will receive a comp pick for Stacy Andrews in either the fourth or fifth round, most likely the fourth, in addition to the third-round comp pick for T.J. Houshmandzadeh.
If Kevin Burnett's value falls in the seventh round instead of the sixth round, San Diego will receive a comp pick for Igor Olshansky instead of a comp pick for Mike Goff. The comp pick for Olshansky will be in either the fifth or sixth round, between Pittsburgh's comp pick for Nate Washington and Minnesota's comp pick for Matt Birk. Or, if Olshansky's value falls in the fifth round, San Diego will receive a fifth-round comp pick for him, regardless of whether Burnett's value falls in the sixth round or seventh round.
If Bobby Engram qualifies, Seattle will receive a seventh-round comp pick for him immediately before its comp pick for Floyd Womack.
If John Owens does not qualify, Seattle will receive a seventh-round comp pick for Leonard Weaver, between Tennessee's comp picks for Eric King and Daniel Loper.
If Floyd Womack does not qualify, Seattle will not receive a comp pick for him.
If Jason Wright does not qualify, Arizona will receive a comp pick for Antonio Smith in either the third round or fourth round, most likely in the third, after Cincinnati's comp pick for T.J. Houshmandzadeh.
If Brett Romberg does not qualify, Atlanta will receive a seventh-round comp pick for Grady Jackson, before Indianapolis' comp pick for Darrell Reid.
If Hunter Smith qualifies, Indianapolis will receive a seventh-round comp pick for him, after New England's comp pick for LaMont Jordan.
If Mark Jones qualifies, Carolina will receive a seventh-round comp pick for him after New England's comp pick for LaMont Jordan (and Indianapolis' comp pick for Hunter Smith, if there is one), and Tennessee will not receive a seventh-round comp pick for Daniel Loper.
If Larry Izzo qualifies, it will not affect the comp picks, because New England already will have received the maximum of four comp picks, but his name will appear on New England's list of qualifying players lost.
If Arizona, Baltimore and/or Buffalo receive net-value comp picks, they would come after Oakland's net-value pick in the seventh round.
Any combination of these additional comp picks and/or fewer comp picks being awarded could increase or reduce the number of non-compensatory picks added to the end of the draft. As I mentioned earlier, the next five teams in line for non-compensatory picks are Cleveland, Oakland, Seattle, Buffalo and Chicago.
Under no circumstances will more than 32 picks be awarded, so if I have made numerous significant mistakes and there are more true comp picks than I have projected, one or more of the lowest-valued picks in my projection or in my summary of possible other scenarios might not be awarded, if they’re not one of the 32 highest-valued comp picks. Only the 32 highest-valued comp picks will be awarded.
The NFL typically awards the compensatory picks on the second day of the Annual Meeting, which will be March 22 this year (the meeting will be March 21-24 in Orlando, Fla.). After the comp picks are announced, I’ll review what the NFL did and where my projections were incorrect, although I’ve already presented some other possibilities.
Note: For a look at why any of the 16 other teams are not projected to receive comp picks, click on the team's name to see my preliminary summary for that team — Arizona, Baltimore, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, New Orleans, N.Y. Giants, N.Y. Jets, St. Louis, Tampa Bay, Washington. You also can click here to see the list of every UFA lost or signed who had the potential of qualifying.
Friday, May 1, 2009
A review of the 2009 NFL draft trades
Three weeks ago, I posted a list of almost every trade from 1992 to 2008 that involved NFL draft picks but not active players. Using that list and a mathematical formula, a fan who posts as Mr. Bighead on the KFFL message boards created a draft pick value chart that indicates the historical value of each draft pick. The value of the No. 1 pick was fixed at 3,000 points, the same value it has in the commonly used value chart. Not surprisingly, though, the chart based on actual trades from 1992 to 2008 is much different from the commonly used chart. In general, higher picks are worth more in the historical chart than in the commonly used chart, and the higher the pick, the greater the difference between the charts.
I tested the historical value chart against certain benchmark trades in the list of trades that I posted, and I found that the chart is quite accurate, at least through five rounds or so. Late in the draft, teams are less likely to have picks that will balance out a trade, so they generally just make two-for-one trades out of the picks they have left and don't worry as much about point values.
In this post, I'll take a look at the trades made during the 2009 NFL draft and see whether teams that traded down got more value or less value than expected, based on trades made from 1992 to 2008.
Here are all of this year's trades that involved only draft picks --
2009 DRAFT
17 = 19, 191
19 = 21, 195
23 = 26, 162
26, 162 = 41, 73, 83
37 = next 1st
40 = 47, 124, 199
43, 111 = next 1st
49 = 68, 105
51 = 75, 110
56 = 61, 165
64, 132 = 79, 84
65 = 76, 115, 228
73 = 232, next 2nd
85 = 91, 164
89 = next 2nd
91 = 137, 213, next 3rd
117 = 120, 229
123, 198 = 137, 141
141 = 156, 210
150 = 158, 221
164 = 222, next 5th
174 = 235, next 5th
202 = 216, next 6th
222 = next 6th
237 = next 7th
Now let's take a look at each trade and the historical values of the picks involved --
17 = 19, 191
The historical value of the 17th pick is 1,419 points. The 19th is worth 1,319, and the 191st is worth 16, for a total of 1,335. Cleveland took 84 points less than the expected value to trade down with Tampa Bay (roughly the value of the 118th or 119th pick).
19 = 21, 195
Again, Cleveland took less than the expected value to trade down, this time with Philadelphia. The 19th pick has a historical value of 1,319 points, the 21st pick is worth 1,229, and the 19th is worth 15, for a total of 1,244 points. Based on those values, Cleveland got 75 fewer points than expected.
23 = 26, 162
This time, it was New England that took less value than expected when it traded down to Baltimore's spot. The 23rd pick's historical value is 1,147 points, compared to a combined 1,068 points for the picks it received (1,037 for the 26th and 31 for the 162nd).
26, 162 = 41, 73, 83
New England traded down again, this time getting higher-than-expected value from Green Bay. For two picks with a combined value of 1,068 points, New England got three picks with a combined value of 1,111 points (646, 263 and 202, respectively).
40 = 47, 124, 199
Oakland traded down with New England, getting a little less value than expected (665 points, compared to 540, 74 and 14 for a total of 628).
49 = 68, 105
This was another trade down for less than expected, with Chicago sending one pick with a historical value of 510 points to Seattle for two picks worth 416 (300 and 116, respectively).
51 = 75, 110
In 2001, Buffalo had the 51st pick and traded down with Denver, dropping seven spots to No. 58 and adding the 110th pick. This year, Dallas had the same original pick (No. 51) but had to drop 24 spots to get the same additional pick (No. 110). Historically, this was 481 points for 352 points (249 plus 103).
56 = 61, 165
Miami traded down with Indianapolis and got less-than-expected value, but not by much. The 56th pick has a historical value of 418 points, compared to 392 for the 61st (363) and 165th (29).
64, 132 = 79, 84
Pittsburgh got slightly better than the expected value for trading down with Denver. Pittsburgh gave up a combined 396 points (335 plus 61) and received 421 (224 plus 197).
65 = 76, 115, 228
Detroit traded the first pick of the draft's second day to the New York Jets for higher-than-expected value. The 65th pick has a historical value of 326 points, compared to a combined 341 for the three picks the Jets sent to Detroit (243, 91 and 7, respectively).
85 = 91, 164
The trade was about as equal as can be, considering that teams usually don't have two picks that add up to the precise value of the one pick for which they want to trade. In this case, Philadelphia traded No. 85, which is valued at 192 points, to the New York Giants for Nos. 91 (165) and 164 (30), which are worth a combined 195 points.
117 = 120, 229
This was another relatively equal trade, with Dallas trading 87 points to Tampa Bay for 88 points (81 plus 7).
123, 198 = 137, 141
Baltimore traded down with New England, getting 15 points more than expected. The 123rd pick is worth 75 and the 198th is worth 14 (89 total), compared to 54 points and 50 points (104 total) for the picks Baltimore received.
141 = 156, 210
Baltimore traded down again, this time getting relatively equal value from Denver. The 141st pick is worth 50 points, compared to a combined 46 points for the 156th (35) and 210th (11) picks.
150 = 158, 221
In another trade for almost equal values, Washington sent 40 points to Minnesota for a combined 43 points (34 plus 9).
37 = next 1st
43, 111 = next 1st
Based on trades from 1992 to 2008, a first-round pick in the next draft is worth 635 points, on average (equal to the value of the 41st or 42nd pick in the current draft). Seattle gave Denver a pick (No. 37) worth 729 points, and San Francisco gave Carolina two picks worth a combined 709 (608 plus 101). Both times, this year's picks yielded less value than expected.
73 = 232, next 2nd
89 = next 2nd
On average, a second-round pick in the next draft is worth 223 points (approximately the 79th pick). New England made both of these trades, getting less than expected from Jacksonville in the first trade (263 points for 223 plus 7) but more than expected from Tennessee in the second trade (178 for 223).
91 = 137, 213, next 3rd
A third-round pick in the next draft has an average value of 91 points, which is equal to the 115th pick. Philadelphia traded down with Seattle, giving up 165 points and getting back 155 (54 plus 10 plus 91) for a relatively equal trade.
164 = 222, next 5th
174 = 235, next 5th
Both of these were relatively equal trades. A fifth-round pick in the next draft is worth an average of 19 points, which is the value of picks No. 183-185. Philadelphia had the 164th pick (30 points) and traded down with New Orleans, getting 27 points in return (8 plus 19). Detroit traded down from No. 174 (24 points), getting 25 points (6 plus 19) back from Denver.
202 = 216, next 6th
222 = next 6th
Historically, a sixth-round pick in the next draft has had an average value of eight points, which is the value of picks Nos. 222-227. Philadelphia traded No. 222 to Indianapolis in a trade for equal values. Carolina got a little more than expected by trading No. 202 to Oakland, giving up a pick worth 13 points and getting 18 points in return (10 plus eight).
237 = next 7th
This was the first known draft-day trade since at least 1992 that involved a seventh-round pick in the following draft and did not involve an active player. Miami sent Kansas City the fifth-to-last pick that could be traded (compensatory picks can't be traded) in exchange for a seventh-round pick next year. Unless Kansas City surprises almost everyone, Miami at least will get a higher seventh-round pick next year than it gave up this year.
2009 draft trends
Here's a look at all 25 trades, with the historical point values traded by each team. The points traded by the team trading down are on the left side, the points dealt by the team trading up are on the right. A > symbol indicates that the team trading down lost value, a < symbol indicates that the team trading down gained value, a ~ symbol indicates that the trade was relatively equal, and a = symbol indicates a trade that was exactly equal.
1,419 > 1,335
1,319 > 1,244
1,147 > 1,068
1,068 < 1,111
729 > 635
709 > 635
665 > 628
510 > 416
481 > 352
418 > 392 (Trade down from pick No. 56)
396 < 421 (Trade down from pick No. 64)
326 < 341
263 > 230
192 ~ 195
178 < 223 (Trade down from pick No. 89)
165 ~ 155 (Trade down from pick No. 91)
87 ~ 88
89 < 104
50 ~ 46
40 ~ 43
30 ~ 27
24 ~ 25
13 < 18
8 = 8
6 > (next 7th)
From this chart, it's apparent that teams didn't value picks in the first two rounds nearly as much as usual. Nine of the first 10 trades down went for less than the historical value of the pick(s) involved. Through 10 trades, the average value lost was 7.7 percent. Starting with the last pick of the second round, picks started trading for higher or equal value than on average from 1992 to 2008. Of the final 15 trades, the team trading down got higher-than-normal value in return five times and equal or relatively equal value eight times. Only twice did a trade down yield less than would be expected. The average value gained in the final 15 trades, starting with the last pick of the second round, was 5.9 percent. These numbers confirm the reports that many teams believed that the 2009 draft was weak at the top but deep in talent.
I tested the historical value chart against certain benchmark trades in the list of trades that I posted, and I found that the chart is quite accurate, at least through five rounds or so. Late in the draft, teams are less likely to have picks that will balance out a trade, so they generally just make two-for-one trades out of the picks they have left and don't worry as much about point values.
In this post, I'll take a look at the trades made during the 2009 NFL draft and see whether teams that traded down got more value or less value than expected, based on trades made from 1992 to 2008.
Here are all of this year's trades that involved only draft picks --
2009 DRAFT
17 = 19, 191
19 = 21, 195
23 = 26, 162
26, 162 = 41, 73, 83
37 = next 1st
40 = 47, 124, 199
43, 111 = next 1st
49 = 68, 105
51 = 75, 110
56 = 61, 165
64, 132 = 79, 84
65 = 76, 115, 228
73 = 232, next 2nd
85 = 91, 164
89 = next 2nd
91 = 137, 213, next 3rd
117 = 120, 229
123, 198 = 137, 141
141 = 156, 210
150 = 158, 221
164 = 222, next 5th
174 = 235, next 5th
202 = 216, next 6th
222 = next 6th
237 = next 7th
Now let's take a look at each trade and the historical values of the picks involved --
17 = 19, 191
The historical value of the 17th pick is 1,419 points. The 19th is worth 1,319, and the 191st is worth 16, for a total of 1,335. Cleveland took 84 points less than the expected value to trade down with Tampa Bay (roughly the value of the 118th or 119th pick).
19 = 21, 195
Again, Cleveland took less than the expected value to trade down, this time with Philadelphia. The 19th pick has a historical value of 1,319 points, the 21st pick is worth 1,229, and the 19th is worth 15, for a total of 1,244 points. Based on those values, Cleveland got 75 fewer points than expected.
23 = 26, 162
This time, it was New England that took less value than expected when it traded down to Baltimore's spot. The 23rd pick's historical value is 1,147 points, compared to a combined 1,068 points for the picks it received (1,037 for the 26th and 31 for the 162nd).
26, 162 = 41, 73, 83
New England traded down again, this time getting higher-than-expected value from Green Bay. For two picks with a combined value of 1,068 points, New England got three picks with a combined value of 1,111 points (646, 263 and 202, respectively).
40 = 47, 124, 199
Oakland traded down with New England, getting a little less value than expected (665 points, compared to 540, 74 and 14 for a total of 628).
49 = 68, 105
This was another trade down for less than expected, with Chicago sending one pick with a historical value of 510 points to Seattle for two picks worth 416 (300 and 116, respectively).
51 = 75, 110
In 2001, Buffalo had the 51st pick and traded down with Denver, dropping seven spots to No. 58 and adding the 110th pick. This year, Dallas had the same original pick (No. 51) but had to drop 24 spots to get the same additional pick (No. 110). Historically, this was 481 points for 352 points (249 plus 103).
56 = 61, 165
Miami traded down with Indianapolis and got less-than-expected value, but not by much. The 56th pick has a historical value of 418 points, compared to 392 for the 61st (363) and 165th (29).
64, 132 = 79, 84
Pittsburgh got slightly better than the expected value for trading down with Denver. Pittsburgh gave up a combined 396 points (335 plus 61) and received 421 (224 plus 197).
65 = 76, 115, 228
Detroit traded the first pick of the draft's second day to the New York Jets for higher-than-expected value. The 65th pick has a historical value of 326 points, compared to a combined 341 for the three picks the Jets sent to Detroit (243, 91 and 7, respectively).
85 = 91, 164
The trade was about as equal as can be, considering that teams usually don't have two picks that add up to the precise value of the one pick for which they want to trade. In this case, Philadelphia traded No. 85, which is valued at 192 points, to the New York Giants for Nos. 91 (165) and 164 (30), which are worth a combined 195 points.
117 = 120, 229
This was another relatively equal trade, with Dallas trading 87 points to Tampa Bay for 88 points (81 plus 7).
123, 198 = 137, 141
Baltimore traded down with New England, getting 15 points more than expected. The 123rd pick is worth 75 and the 198th is worth 14 (89 total), compared to 54 points and 50 points (104 total) for the picks Baltimore received.
141 = 156, 210
Baltimore traded down again, this time getting relatively equal value from Denver. The 141st pick is worth 50 points, compared to a combined 46 points for the 156th (35) and 210th (11) picks.
150 = 158, 221
In another trade for almost equal values, Washington sent 40 points to Minnesota for a combined 43 points (34 plus 9).
37 = next 1st
43, 111 = next 1st
Based on trades from 1992 to 2008, a first-round pick in the next draft is worth 635 points, on average (equal to the value of the 41st or 42nd pick in the current draft). Seattle gave Denver a pick (No. 37) worth 729 points, and San Francisco gave Carolina two picks worth a combined 709 (608 plus 101). Both times, this year's picks yielded less value than expected.
73 = 232, next 2nd
89 = next 2nd
On average, a second-round pick in the next draft is worth 223 points (approximately the 79th pick). New England made both of these trades, getting less than expected from Jacksonville in the first trade (263 points for 223 plus 7) but more than expected from Tennessee in the second trade (178 for 223).
91 = 137, 213, next 3rd
A third-round pick in the next draft has an average value of 91 points, which is equal to the 115th pick. Philadelphia traded down with Seattle, giving up 165 points and getting back 155 (54 plus 10 plus 91) for a relatively equal trade.
164 = 222, next 5th
174 = 235, next 5th
Both of these were relatively equal trades. A fifth-round pick in the next draft is worth an average of 19 points, which is the value of picks No. 183-185. Philadelphia had the 164th pick (30 points) and traded down with New Orleans, getting 27 points in return (8 plus 19). Detroit traded down from No. 174 (24 points), getting 25 points (6 plus 19) back from Denver.
202 = 216, next 6th
222 = next 6th
Historically, a sixth-round pick in the next draft has had an average value of eight points, which is the value of picks Nos. 222-227. Philadelphia traded No. 222 to Indianapolis in a trade for equal values. Carolina got a little more than expected by trading No. 202 to Oakland, giving up a pick worth 13 points and getting 18 points in return (10 plus eight).
237 = next 7th
This was the first known draft-day trade since at least 1992 that involved a seventh-round pick in the following draft and did not involve an active player. Miami sent Kansas City the fifth-to-last pick that could be traded (compensatory picks can't be traded) in exchange for a seventh-round pick next year. Unless Kansas City surprises almost everyone, Miami at least will get a higher seventh-round pick next year than it gave up this year.
2009 draft trends
Here's a look at all 25 trades, with the historical point values traded by each team. The points traded by the team trading down are on the left side, the points dealt by the team trading up are on the right. A > symbol indicates that the team trading down lost value, a < symbol indicates that the team trading down gained value, a ~ symbol indicates that the trade was relatively equal, and a = symbol indicates a trade that was exactly equal.
1,419 > 1,335
1,319 > 1,244
1,147 > 1,068
1,068 < 1,111
729 > 635
709 > 635
665 > 628
510 > 416
481 > 352
418 > 392 (Trade down from pick No. 56)
396 < 421 (Trade down from pick No. 64)
326 < 341
263 > 230
192 ~ 195
178 < 223 (Trade down from pick No. 89)
165 ~ 155 (Trade down from pick No. 91)
87 ~ 88
89 < 104
50 ~ 46
40 ~ 43
30 ~ 27
24 ~ 25
13 < 18
8 = 8
6 > (next 7th)
From this chart, it's apparent that teams didn't value picks in the first two rounds nearly as much as usual. Nine of the first 10 trades down went for less than the historical value of the pick(s) involved. Through 10 trades, the average value lost was 7.7 percent. Starting with the last pick of the second round, picks started trading for higher or equal value than on average from 1992 to 2008. Of the final 15 trades, the team trading down got higher-than-normal value in return five times and equal or relatively equal value eight times. Only twice did a trade down yield less than would be expected. The average value gained in the final 15 trades, starting with the last pick of the second round, was 5.9 percent. These numbers confirm the reports that many teams believed that the 2009 draft was weak at the top but deep in talent.
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