A review of the 2009 NFL draft trades

Three weeks ago, I posted a list of almost every trade from 1992 to 2008 that involved NFL draft picks but not active players. Using that list and a mathematical formula, a fan who posts as Mr. Bighead on the KFFL message boards created a draft pick value chart that indicates the historical value of each draft pick. The value of the No. 1 pick was fixed at 3,000 points, the same value it has in the commonly used value chart. Not surprisingly, though, the chart based on actual trades from 1992 to 2008 is much different from the commonly used chart. In general, higher picks are worth more in the historical chart than in the commonly used chart, and the higher the pick, the greater the difference between the charts.

I tested the historical value chart against certain benchmark trades in the list of trades that I posted, and I found that the chart is quite accurate, at least through five rounds or so. Late in the draft, teams are less likely to have picks that will balance out a trade, so they generally just make two-for-one trades out of the picks they have left and don't worry as much about point values.

In this post, I'll take a look at the trades made during the 2009 NFL draft and see whether teams that traded down got more value or less value than expected, based on trades made from 1992 to 2008.

Here are all of this year's trades that involved only draft picks --


2009 DRAFT

17 = 19, 191
19 = 21, 195
23 = 26, 162
26, 162 = 41, 73, 83
37 = next 1st
40 = 47, 124, 199
43, 111 = next 1st
49 = 68, 105
51 = 75, 110
56 = 61, 165
64, 132 = 79, 84
65 = 76, 115, 228
73 = 232, next 2nd
85 = 91, 164
89 = next 2nd
91 = 137, 213, next 3rd
117 = 120, 229
123, 198 = 137, 141
141 = 156, 210
150 = 158, 221
164 = 222, next 5th
174 = 235, next 5th
202 = 216, next 6th
222 = next 6th
237 = next 7th



Now let's take a look at each trade and the historical values of the picks involved --


17 = 19, 191

The historical value of the 17th pick is 1,419 points. The 19th is worth 1,319, and the 191st is worth 16, for a total of 1,335. Cleveland took 84 points less than the expected value to trade down with Tampa Bay (roughly the value of the 118th or 119th pick).


19 = 21, 195

Again, Cleveland took less than the expected value to trade down, this time with Philadelphia. The 19th pick has a historical value of 1,319 points, the 21st pick is worth 1,229, and the 19th is worth 15, for a total of 1,244 points. Based on those values, Cleveland got 75 fewer points than expected.


23 = 26, 162

This time, it was New England that took less value than expected when it traded down to Baltimore's spot. The 23rd pick's historical value is 1,147 points, compared to a combined 1,068 points for the picks it received (1,037 for the 26th and 31 for the 162nd).


26, 162 = 41, 73, 83

New England traded down again, this time getting higher-than-expected value from Green Bay. For two picks with a combined value of 1,068 points, New England got three picks with a combined value of 1,111 points (646, 263 and 202, respectively).


40 = 47, 124, 199

Oakland traded down with New England, getting a little less value than expected (665 points, compared to 540, 74 and 14 for a total of 628).


49 = 68, 105

This was another trade down for less than expected, with Chicago sending one pick with a historical value of 510 points to Seattle for two picks worth 416 (300 and 116, respectively).


51 = 75, 110

In 2001, Buffalo had the 51st pick and traded down with Denver, dropping seven spots to No. 58 and adding the 110th pick. This year, Dallas had the same original pick (No. 51) but had to drop 24 spots to get the same additional pick (No. 110). Historically, this was 481 points for 352 points (249 plus 103).


56 = 61, 165

Miami traded down with Indianapolis and got less-than-expected value, but not by much. The 56th pick has a historical value of 418 points, compared to 392 for the 61st (363) and 165th (29).


64, 132 = 79, 84

Pittsburgh got slightly better than the expected value for trading down with Denver. Pittsburgh gave up a combined 396 points (335 plus 61) and received 421 (224 plus 197).


65 = 76, 115, 228

Detroit traded the first pick of the draft's second day to the New York Jets for higher-than-expected value. The 65th pick has a historical value of 326 points, compared to a combined 341 for the three picks the Jets sent to Detroit (243, 91 and 7, respectively).


85 = 91, 164

The trade was about as equal as can be, considering that teams usually don't have two picks that add up to the precise value of the one pick for which they want to trade. In this case, Philadelphia traded No. 85, which is valued at 192 points, to the New York Giants for Nos. 91 (165) and 164 (30), which are worth a combined 195 points.


117 = 120, 229

This was another relatively equal trade, with Dallas trading 87 points to Tampa Bay for 88 points (81 plus 7).


123, 198 = 137, 141

Baltimore traded down with New England, getting 15 points more than expected. The 123rd pick is worth 75 and the 198th is worth 14 (89 total), compared to 54 points and 50 points (104 total) for the picks Baltimore received.


141 = 156, 210

Baltimore traded down again, this time getting relatively equal value from Denver. The 141st pick is worth 50 points, compared to a combined 46 points for the 156th (35) and 210th (11) picks.


150 = 158, 221

In another trade for almost equal values, Washington sent 40 points to Minnesota for a combined 43 points (34 plus 9).


37 = next 1st
43, 111 = next 1st

Based on trades from 1992 to 2008, a first-round pick in the next draft is worth 635 points, on average (equal to the value of the 41st or 42nd pick in the current draft). Seattle gave Denver a pick (No. 37) worth 729 points, and San Francisco gave Carolina two picks worth a combined 709 (608 plus 101). Both times, this year's picks yielded less value than expected.


73 = 232, next 2nd
89 = next 2nd

On average, a second-round pick in the next draft is worth 223 points (approximately the 79th pick). New England made both of these trades, getting less than expected from Jacksonville in the first trade (263 points for 223 plus 7) but more than expected from Tennessee in the second trade (178 for 223).


91 = 137, 213, next 3rd

A third-round pick in the next draft has an average value of 91 points, which is equal to the 115th pick. Philadelphia traded down with Seattle, giving up 165 points and getting back 155 (54 plus 10 plus 91) for a relatively equal trade.


164 = 222, next 5th
174 = 235, next 5th

Both of these were relatively equal trades. A fifth-round pick in the next draft is worth an average of 19 points, which is the value of picks No. 183-185. Philadelphia had the 164th pick (30 points) and traded down with New Orleans, getting 27 points in return (8 plus 19). Detroit traded down from No. 174 (24 points), getting 25 points (6 plus 19) back from Denver.


202 = 216, next 6th
222 = next 6th

Historically, a sixth-round pick in the next draft has had an average value of eight points, which is the value of picks Nos. 222-227. Philadelphia traded No. 222 to Indianapolis in a trade for equal values. Carolina got a little more than expected by trading No. 202 to Oakland, giving up a pick worth 13 points and getting 18 points in return (10 plus eight).


237 = next 7th

This was the first known draft-day trade since at least 1992 that involved a seventh-round pick in the following draft and did not involve an active player. Miami sent Kansas City the fifth-to-last pick that could be traded (compensatory picks can't be traded) in exchange for a seventh-round pick next year. Unless Kansas City surprises almost everyone, Miami at least will get a higher seventh-round pick next year than it gave up this year.


2009 draft trends

Here's a look at all 25 trades, with the historical point values traded by each team. The points traded by the team trading down are on the left side, the points dealt by the team trading up are on the right. A > symbol indicates that the team trading down lost value, a < symbol indicates that the team trading down gained value, a ~ symbol indicates that the trade was relatively equal, and a = symbol indicates a trade that was exactly equal.

1,419 > 1,335
1,319 > 1,244
1,147 > 1,068
1,068 < 1,111
729 > 635
709 > 635
665 > 628
510 > 416
481 > 352
418 > 392 (Trade down from pick No. 56)

396 < 421 (Trade down from pick No. 64)
326 < 341
263 > 230
192 ~ 195
178 < 223 (Trade down from pick No. 89)

165 ~ 155 (Trade down from pick No. 91)
87 ~ 88
89 < 104
50 ~ 46
40 ~ 43
30 ~ 27
24 ~ 25
13 < 18
8 = 8
6 > (next 7th)

From this chart, it's apparent that teams didn't value picks in the first two rounds nearly as much as usual. Nine of the first 10 trades down went for less than the historical value of the pick(s) involved. Through 10 trades, the average value lost was 7.7 percent. Starting with the last pick of the second round, picks started trading for higher or equal value than on average from 1992 to 2008. Of the final 15 trades, the team trading down got higher-than-normal value in return five times and equal or relatively equal value eight times. Only twice did a trade down yield less than would be expected. The average value gained in the final 15 trades, starting with the last pick of the second round, was 5.9 percent. These numbers confirm the reports that many teams believed that the 2009 draft was weak at the top but deep in talent.

The rookie pool and the salary cap

A lot of people, including many in the media, have a misunderstanding of how the salary cap and rookie pools are intertwined, beyond the misnomer of "a cap within a cap." This post is an attempt to explain exactly how the rookie pool works and how it relates to the cap.

First, a couple of definitions:

Rule of 51: This is the commonly used name for the rule explained in Article XXIV, Section 7, subsection (a)(i) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The rule states, "between March 1 and the first day of the regular playing season, only the following amounts from Paragraph 5 shall be included for players whose Player Contracts are not among the Team’s 51 highest valued Player Contracts, tenders and Offer Sheets (as determined under this Section 7): (1) Any amount that exceeds the Minimum Active/Inactive List Salary for Undrafted Rookie Free Agents; and (2) Any amount that exceeds twice the applicable Minimum Active/Inactive List Salary for all other players."

In simple terms, it means that during the offseason, for any player whose cap number is not among his team's 51 highest cap numbers, his base salary ("Paragraph 5" salary) does not count against the cap. The two exceptions listed above ("any amount that exceeds ...") are not known to have ever come into play, because teams traditionally give undrafted rookies minimum base salaries, and it would be extremely unlikely for a team to have a player outside its Top 51 with a base salary more than twice his applicable minimum.

As an example of how the Rule of 51 works, consider a team whose 51st-highest cap number for current players (contracts, tenders or offer sheets) is $400,000. The team's next-highest cap number is $397,280, which is for a second-year player with a base salary of $385,000, a signing bonus proration of $5,000 and a standard workout bonus of $7,280. Because this player is outside the hypothetical team's Top 51, his minimum base salary does not count against the cap, but the other $12,280 does. The same thing would apply to the rest of the team's players outside its Top 51: their minimum base salaries would not count against the cap, but everything else would. (All "dead money" also counts against the cap.)

Rookie pool: On a league-wide basis, the rookie pool (described in Article XVII of the CBA) is the total amount of money that can be spent on rookies, except that the minimum base salaries for undrafted rookies do not count toward the rookie pool. Each team's rookie pool is its portion of the league-wide total and is determined by the number, round and position of the draft choices it uses.

Basically, the entire first-year cap numbers for all of a team's draft choices must fit into its rookie pool, along with any first-year cap charges for undrafted rookies other than their minimum base salaries.

After the draft, teams are told the amount of their rookie pool, but they never are told the rookie pool value for each draft pick. However, astute teams — presumably all of them — could estimate with reasonable precision the specific rookie pool value of each pick prior to the draft. When teams sign a drafted player, his first-year cap number does not have to be equal, or even close to, the rookie pool value of the pick used to select him, as long as the team's combined rookie pool charges for all of its rookies don't exceed its limit.


How it all works

Saying that the rookie pool is "a cap within a cap" is a bit of a misnomer because the rookie pool actually is a separate accounting from the salary cap, although rookies count toward both limits. The calculations are different, though, so the amount a rookie counts against the rookie pool isn't necessarily the same as the amount he counts against the salary cap.

When a player is drafted, he automatically is tendered a one-year contract for the rookie minimum base salary (for 2009, that is $310,000). This amount immediately is applied to the team's rookie pool and salary cap. Because most teams have at least 51 players with cap numbers higher than the rookie minimum salary before the draft, the automatic tenders for drafted players won't affect those teams' cap at all. It sometimes is mistakenly reported that teams must have cap room in order to use their draft choices, but that applies only to teams that have fewer than 51 players signed or tendered at the time of the draft. And even then, it applies only to the number of draft choices a team uses until it has 51 players signed or tendered. So, for example, if a team had 49 players signed or tendered before the draft, it would need only $620,000 of cap room in order to make all of its selections. After the first two draftees are automatically tendered, the team would have 51 players signed or tendered, and the rest of the team's draftees would fall outside its 51 highest cap numbers and would not affect its cap.

When a drafted player signs his contract, the team is charged against its salary cap according to the Rule of 51, and it is charged against its rookie pool according to the rules in Article XVII.

Let's consider a seventh-round draft pick who signs a four-year contract with minimum base salaries and a $44,000 signing bonus and who was selected by a team with its 51st-highest cap number being $400,000 (for a second-year player with a $385,000 base salary). His first-year cap number would be $321,000, consisting of his $310,000 base salary and his $11,000 bonus proration. Because he was drafted, the entire $321,000 would count against his team's rookie pool, replacing his automatic tender. But because he is below his team's top 51 cap numbers, only his $11,000 bonus proration counts against the salary cap during the offseason.

Now consider a third-round draft pick for the same team. He signs a four-year contract with minimum base salaries and a signing bonus of $700,000. His first-year cap number would be $485,000, consisting of his $310,000 base salary and his $175,000 bonus proration. All $485,000 would count against his team's rookie pool and against his team's salary cap. However, by assuming his place in the team's top 51 cap numbers, he knocks the player with a $400,000 cap number ($385,000 base salary) out of the team's top 51. For that player, his base salary no longer counts against the cap, leaving only the other $15,000 counting against the cap. The net result is that the team's cap room is reduced by only $100,000 — the draftee's $485,000 is charged against the cap, but the second-year player's $385,000 base salary no longer is.

As you can see, as long as his team already has at least 51 players signed or tendered — as all 32 teams did by April 15 — a draftee's effect on his team's salary cap is far less than his rookie pool charge. Most people forget this when they consider how much cap room must be "set aside" for rookies. You'll often see people say that, for example, if a team has $5 million of cap room and a rookie pool of $4 million, it has only $1 million available to spend on other players. Of course, if the team already has close to or more than 51 players signed or tendered, that's wrong, because that team's rookies will reduce its salary cap by far less than $4 million, as shown above.

As long as a team has at least 51 players already signed or tendered, it is impossible for its entire rookie class to reduce its cap room by more than its rookie pool minus the amount equal to the minimum rookie salary times the number of draftees signed. For example, if a team with a rookie pool of $5.1 million already has at least 51 players signed or tendered, then signs all 10 of its draftees and any number of undrafted rookies, it is impossible for the team's entire rookie class to reduce its cap room by more than $2 million. That's because the $310,000 base salary of every undrafted rookie and every draftee who doesn't make the team's top 51 won't count against the cap, and every draftee who does make the top 51 will knock another player's base salary of at least $310,000 out of the top 51.

To determine the maximum amount that a team's entire rookie class could reduce its cap room, it is necessary to know how many players it has signed or tendered, how many of its draftees are likely to have first-year cap numbers that qualify for its top 51 and the cap numbers and base salaries for as many players at the bottom of its top 51 as it has draftees who will qualify for the top 51.

If all of that is not known, a reasonable estimate for most teams this season can be made by starting with the team's rookie pool, then subtracting $385,000 for each draft pick in the first four rounds and $310,000 for each draft pick in the fifth, sixth or seventh rounds. For example, a team with a rookie pool of $4 million and one draft pick in each round will use approximately $1.53 million of cap room to sign all of its rookies ($4 million, minus the $1.54 million for the four players displaced in the team's top 51, minus $930,000 for the three late-round draftees whose base salaries won't count against the cap). Using this method might not be precise for every team, but it will give you a pretty good estimate.